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Chapter 1
The Evolution of Retirement
Risk Management
Robert L. Clark and Olivia S. Mitchell
Retirement risk management will require significant modification if it is to
be effective in helping position retirees to withstand the challenges of the
future. Recent economic events, including the massive upheaval in global
financial markets, have altered the landscape in which pension and endow-
ment funds operate. Plummeting retirement asset values, along with
employers’ and employees’ inability to make pension contributions, are
contributing to sharp drops in retirement plan funding. In many countries,
government social security systems are also facing insolvency. These factors,
in tandem with an aging population and rising longevity, are giving rise to
serious questions about the future of retirement in America and around
the world.
This volume explores how workers and firms can reassess the risk asso-
ciated with retirement saving and make creative adjustments to adapt to
these new risks and realities. Our effort is grouped into three areas. First,
we take up the key role for financial knowledge, implying a need for greater
financial education programs. Second, we show how employers, acting as
plan sponsors, and workers, must reconsider pension plan design so as to
help them better address the new realities. Third, we argue that novel
financial products will be required to help retirement plans innovate in
the financing arena. The chapter authors of this volume, each an expert in
his or her field, take up all these important aspects of retirement planning,
providing new research and policy recommendations, and showing how
retirement plans can be amended to better meet the retirement needs of
workers and firms. This introductory chapter provides an orientation and a
brief overview of key findings.
Revisiting retirement saving and dissaving
The last 2 decades have brought about a global shift from defined benefit
(DB) pensions to defined contribution (DC) plans. According to Brett
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Hammond and David Richardson (2010), this will require new ways of
conceptualizing retirement saving adequacy. In traditional DB pensions,
participants can project what future benefits will be as a percent of salary
using their plan formulas; such formulas usually depend on a generosity
parameter (e.g., 1.5 percent) times years of service, multiplied by final
average salary. Accordingly, an employee with 30 years of service would
have a pension replacement rate of 45 percent, which – along with Social
Security benefits – can then be evaluated as to whether it is sufficient to retire
on. By contrast, participants in DC plans may know their asset accruals but
generally will be unable to convert these into benefit payout amounts.
To help approach this problem, the authors devise a measure they call
the ‘asset/salary ratio’ (ASR), which accounts for future salary growth, rates
of return, discount rates, the number of years expected in retirement, and
estate planning needs. The most important inputs are contribution rates
and the number of years contributed, notwithstanding popular emphasis
on asset allocation, fund choice, and consultants. Next, using information
from Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, College Retirement
Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) data files on 3.5 million people, Hammond
and Richardson measure how well funded participants are, by comparing
the value of assets accumulated against likely future spending patterns in
retirement. Their analysis indicates that, on average, the participants they
study were more than adequately funded for retirement. The authors
conclude that achieving sufficient retirement saving requires early and contin-
uous contributions to retirement accounts, relatively high contribution rates,
tilting allocations toward greater use of equities, and using catch-up contribu-
tions to increase account balances. Thus, pension plans that encourage early
participation and provide strong incentives for increased contributions raise
the likelihood that participants will be secure in retirement.
Retirement security also depends on financial literacy, and there is
mounting evidence that many employees lack basic information about
their retirement plans and financial mathematics. To counter this, the
work by Robert Clark, Melinda Morrill, and Steven Allen (2010) examines
the effectiveness of employer-provided financial education and preretire-
ment planning programs. As individuals begin to transition from full-time
work into retirement, they confront several key decisions that will affect
their well-being in retirement. Without appropriate knowledge and infor-
mation, many will make incorrect choices. Important retirement-related
questions include when to retire from one’s career job, whether to take a
lump-sum distribution from a DB plan, whether to annuitize a 401(k)
account, and when to claim Social Security payments. Many of these deci-
sions are irreversible and will have profound impacts on financial well-
being throughout retirement.
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Recognizing the difficulty of making these decisions, several larger em-
ployers have recently sponsored educational programs to help with the
decision process. Clark and colleagues examine nine large companies and
chart characteristics of the financial education sessions offered; some are
conducted in-house, while others are offered by outside financial education
groups. The sessions range in length from 1.5 hours to 2.5 days. Seminar
participants were asked to respond to a short survey on financial planning
both before and after the education sessions. The authors show that the
sessions did enhance financial knowledge, and as a result of the programs,
employees changed their planned retirement behavior. Plans to annuitize
401(k) accounts and or take lump-sum distributions also changed.
When employer education is unavailable, people may instead turn to
retirement calculators to help them with retirement planning. In their
chapter, Anna Rappaport and John Turner (2010) examine how well com-
puter calculators do in projecting future retirement income needs and
accumulations. Their review suggests that many of these programs are too
simple and provide misleading information about retirement saving. Fur-
thermore, the programs often fail to address key retirement risks; instead,
the information presented frequently masks risks that can fundamentally
alter expected retirement income flows. The programs also differ in the
ways they treat economic and personal variables: for instance, some ignore
owner-occupied housing as an asset, while others compute the annuity value
of housing, assuming the asset is fully liquid. Most calculators fail to address
residential market risk, and none handles variable rate mortgages. The
programs also do a poor job of estimating expected returns on retirement
saving accounts, with many overestimating future rates and ignoring invest-
ment fees. A related problem is that few of the retirement advice programs
properly model Social Security, though the government-provided benefit is
the most important component of retirement income for many. Indeed,
many calculators do a poor job of predicting Social Security benefits; for
example, one uses the same payment regardless of the worker’s age or length
of work life. Further, the software packages differ dramatically in their assess-
ments of retirement readiness, often taking too short a time horizon and
underestimating longevity. Thus, many who follow the advice given by the
programs may ultimately run out of money.
Nevertheless, the authors point out that using retirement planning
software can help users to begin thinking about their long-term financial
needs, even if the programs have some shortcomings. And these programs
are now easier to use than were the earlier versions of financial planning
programs. Finally, the software used by professional financial planners can
be substantially more sophisticated, with some including Monte Carlo
simulation approaches (rarely included in free consumer-oriented online
programs).
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Turning to retirement planning advice offered by employers, Lynn
Pettus and Hall Kesmodel (2010) not that this is easier now than before,
due to the passage of the Pension Protection Act (PPA) in 2006. The law
sought to address concerns about whether employers would be in violation
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by taking on a
fiduciary role if they provided services to employees to help them learn
about retirement saving and investment. Thus, the PPA was intended to
increase the availability of high-quality advice to employees, and in fact
some progress has been made: plan provider alliances now cover at least
43 million participants and more than half of those plan sponsors offer
advice. The primary delivery model for employer-provided financial educa-
tion programs is through online computer models and support programs
with financial advisors acting as intermediaries.
Nevertheless, online computer models may not be the best method of
providing actionable advice since some prefer to work with an advisor face
to face. Moreover, computer programs intended to help with retirement
saving plans often do not take into account the participant’s larger finan-
cial situation. For example, a model may endorse the employee’s decision
to increase 401(k) contributions from 3 to 4 percent, yet for a worker
carrying credit card debt with high interest rates, it might be more sensible
to pay down those obligations. On the other hand, a financial advisor may
face conflicts of interest; thus, some advisors could favor one financial
product over another based on commissions, and financial advisors work-
ing in an employee education program may appear to have the employer’s
tacit endorsement. For these reasons, plan sponsors may wish to consider
expanding financial planning education to cover more than just retire-
ment saving and take into account housing, overall debt, and tax consid-
erations as well, and to be alert to possible conflict of interest issues.
The environment for retirement plan redesign
While it seems clear that labor income risk should be a central determinant
of one’s retirement saving path, this topic is often overlooked in practice.
For this reason, Raimond Maurer, Olivia Mitchell, and Ralph Rogalla
(2010) undertake an analysis of how this form of risk can be mitigated in
DC pension plans, taking into account social security as well. The authors
find that human capital is many peoples’ single most important asset and,
as such, it should be included in any analysis of retirement portfolios. The
authors argue that those with stable incomes and DB pensions will optimal-
ly develop a different asset mix than would investment bankers with highly
variable and volatile earnings.
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To examine what this means in practice, the authors construct a simula-
tion model to derive recommended portfolio allocations, taking into ac-
count social security, labor income certainty, endogenous retirement ages,
and differences in individual risk aversion. Their results imply that, for
most people, it will be optimal to gradually purchase annuities over the life
cycle. That is, people with very low labor income risk and high social
security benefits should hold high equity positions while working, and
begin to buy payout annuities around age 55. Those with higher labor
income and low social security benefits should start to purchase payout
annuities earlier, at around age 40. By doing so, people can build up their
own individualized DB plan. The authors also point out that people who
have purchased annuities have a steady stream of secondary income to
buffer against labor income risk, which then permits them to hold more
equity.
To further examine the interaction between pension benefits and pen-
sion plan type, Craig Copeland and Jack VanDerhei (2010) evaluate how
pension freezes can influence retirement incomes. Their specific objective
is to quantify the amount of potential retirement income foregone when
employers freeze their DB plans, a phenomenon that has become quite
prevalent following the 2006 passage of the Pension Protection Act, which
added new funding requirements. It is important to note that some em-
ployers simply froze their DB programs, but others enriched their DC
contributions in the process. The chapter draws on employer-provided
survey data and a retirement projection model to gauge benefit generosity.
The researchers report that when DB plans freeze accruals for new employ-
ees, expected nominal replacement rates fall by less than 1 percent for
employees under age 25 and over 55, and 2 percent for those aged 30–34.
Next, Copeland and VanDerhei show that 40 percent of DB participants
aged 20–24 would have better replacement rates with an enhanced DC
plan, but the figure falls below 10 percent for people over 55. The chapter
concludes that, as companies move away from ‘paternalistic’ DB plans,
employers will provide automatic enrollment in saving plans to encourage
participation.
A different model for plan design is offered by Damon Silvers (2010),
who sees voluntary individualized retirement accounts as a failure, in part
because people are allowed to extract assets from their DC plans. Instead,
he argues that new formats for collective retirement plans are needed to
address the disconnect between short-term market volatility and the long-
term needs of pension funds. He has proposed a new plan structure
whereby a demographically diverse workforce could unite to set up a
pension that would buy portfolio insurance issued in the form of a deriva-
tive that would keep plan assets stable, even as the value of the underlying
portfolio fluctuated. Yet the financial crisis has suggested that precisely
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when this type of risk management solution is needed, it will not be
available. This may mean that government plans would have to be expand-
ed to address three forms of risk. Investment risk can be handled by a
collective professional management of assets with no more than 10 percent
of a portfolio in company stock. Longevity risk can be addressed with
mandatory annuitization and tougher limits on the ability to withdraw
saving. Employer credit risk could be diminished with universal pension
portability and a shift away from employer-sponsored plans.
A key element of retirement income security involves annuitization, with
some governments moving gradually to increase retiree participation in
such longevity protection. In Singapore, the government has ordered that
mandatory annuitization will be rolled out as part of the compulsory
Singaporean Central Provident Fund (CPF) scheme. Joelle Fong, Olivia
Mitchell, and Benedict Koh (2010) explore this proposal and discuss the
implications of requiring participants to purchase annuities. Clearly, man-
datory annuitization will help avoid adverse selection, but how important
this is, is an empirical question. After evaluating the private annuity market
in Singapore, the authors conclude that private insurance offers good value
for the money and the relatively low fraction of participants currently
purchasing voluntary annuities is mainly attributable to inertia and finan-
cial illiteracy. Therefore, the new program may crowd out private offerings,
though retirees may benefit due to limitations on withdrawals and manda-
tory annuitization.
Innovations in retirement risk financing
As noted at the outset, novel financial products will also be required to help
retirement plans confront and manage risks innovatively. In his chapter,
Igor Balevich (2010) discusses longevity risk and explores how pension
plans might outsource longevity protection. While expected life spans
have risen steadily in the last century, there is still much debate about
whether the pace of longevity improvement will continue, in the face of
rising obesity and related health risks. Balevich outlines three main ap-
proaches to the problem: plan design, risk transfer to insurers, and hedg-
ing. The shift from DB to DC plans has already moved longevity risk – and
many other uncertainties – from the employer to the employee, particular-
ly when retirees take lump sums instead of annuitizing with their employ-
ers. Risk transfer to an insurer permits a pension plan to eliminate its
exposure to longevity by purchasing annuities; in the United Kingdom,
several companies have already moved into this business, challenging tradi-
tional insurance companies. In the United States, the US Treasury Depart-
ment and Internal Revenue Service essentially banned noninsurance-based
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risk transfers in the United States as of mid-2008. Another way to cope with
longevity risk, rather than attempting to eliminate it entirely, is to hedge
the risk through derivative products such as longevity swaps. A longevity
swap allows a plan to make fixed payments based on mortality expectations
and receive floating payments tied to the mortality experience of the
underlying population. The contract would be for a shorter period of
time than the full term of the pension payout, but multiple contracts
could be staggered with varying maturity dates. Since this hedge is not
perfect, firms could be left with basis risk associated with the difference in
mortality in their own population versus the national population.
In addition to building retirement assets, a major concern of retirement
planning is how to best utilize assets in retirement. The mutual fund
industry has been working actively to offer products that compete with
the insurers, and John Ameriks, Michael Hess, and Liqian Ren (2010)
assess several payout products currently available on the market. The global
financial crisis has introduced many new uncertainties into retirement
planning, particularly with guaranteed products facing difficult times.
The researchers explore mutual fund products that involve a mechanism
to provide periodic drawdowns, identifying are two main types: the ‘endow-
ment’ style that seeks to provide payouts in perpetuity and the ‘time-
horizon’ style where payments are scheduled over a set period. Neither
type of plan offers guaranteed payments or returns; instead, they offer
targeted or formula-driven distributions of assets along with a professional-
ly managed investment portfolio. One criticism of these plans is that
investors could construct similar evaluations themselves, raising the ques-
tion of whether bundling by fund managers is worth 50 or 60 basis points.
To understand how payout funds and other retirement income vehicles
perform over time, the authors simulate a 30-year time-horizon fund with
an initial target payout rate of 5 percent. They compare this plan to other
schemes including systematic distribution from a balanced mutual fund, a
fixed lifetime income annuity, a variable immediate annuity, a variable
annuity with a guarantee, a required minimum distribution plan, and
combination strategies. They present a range of outcomes including in-
come volatility, the probability of exhausting funds, the residual portfolio
value, and internal rate of return. Their analysis shows that all strategies
produce a wide variety of outcomes, including payouts and the wealth
remaining to be bequeathed.
Another innovation in retirement finance is risk budgeting. The Canada
Pension Plan (CPP) portfolio is managed according to this principle, as
described by Sterling Gunn and Tracy Livingstone (2010). The authors
point to three key points concerning risk budgeting. First, it is not an ‘off-
the-shelf’ solution, but must be tailored to each fund. Second, it is also a
way to reinforce investment decisions with total portfolio objectives. Third,
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it challenges an organization to quantify its risk and accept that number.
CPP is a three-tiered plan made up of a basic old-age supplement, a
contributory pension, and voluntary saving. The scheme underwent
major reforms in 1997 to enhance retirement saving adequacy, including
setting contribution rates at the current rate of 9.9 percent. Interestingly,
when the CPP Investment Board (CPPIB) was created in 1999, its establish-
ment was coupled with limitations on federal government intervention; in
exchange, the government made it clear to pension officials that contribu-
tion rates could not be raised again. As a result of this compromise, risk
budgets have become part of the annual business planning process and
require set expectations for the amount of risk needed to achieve return
targets; the Board must annually approve an active risk limit, explaining
exactly how much discretion management has to deviate from the refer-
ence portfolio. In practice, this has been particularly challenging in evalu-
ating real estate and infrastructure investments.
Another interesting way to manage retirement risk is the Voluntary
Employees’ Beneficiary Association (VEBA), a scheme that seeks to pre-
serve workers’ health-care benefits even as companies offering them are
restructuring. Aaron Bernstein (2010) explores the benefits and risks of
these plans in his chapter, which notes that the VEBA is a century-old
concept. VEBAs are essentially trust funds – originally set up to help pre-
fund retiree health obligations. Today, there are about 12,000 of these
flexible, tax-advantaged funds that, until now, were considered to be ‘hum-
drum’ internal funding schemes. They became nationally prominent in
2007, however, when the United Auto Workers (UAW) negotiated with
Detroit automakers and succeeded in placing the retiree health obligations
in VEBAs. Since VEBA is an independent trust fund responsible for retiree
health care for a specified number of people, if it runs short of money,
there will be insufficient funds to cover the health care of the participants.
And the employer is absolved of responsibility for providing additional
monies to cover shortfalls. While Bernstein believes these funds have
some shortcomings, given the plight of the automakers, VEBAs may have
helped save jobs because they allowed employers to shift pension obliga-
tions off their books, laying the groundwork for deeper restructuring.
Today, VEBAs are mainly found in the heavily unionized sectors, because
union-directed funds are not subject to limits imposed by Congress in 1984
designed to prevent employers from using VEBAs as tax shelters.
Following the global economic slump and sharp downturns in sales
triggering bankruptcy filings by General Motors and Chrysler, VEBAs
have now given employees a seat at the table during their employers’
restructurings. For instance, financed in part by company stock at Chrysler,
VEBAs gave employees an important position in bankruptcy proceedings;
the union has gained 55 percent of the company as a result of its VEBA
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obligations, and union employees are now placed ahead of bondholders
and creditors in court proceedings.
Conclusion
The global financial crisis has brought unpredictable capital markets,
widespread unemployment, poor corporate earnings, and weak global
economies. These factors will continue to threaten the future of retirement
security for older workers and retirees for years to come. Yet the crisis also
affords an opportunity to revisit, reexamine, and adjust the institutions and
programs on which we have relied in the past for retirement saving. In
doing so, we have reconsidered the opportunities these plans provide for
workers to accumulate sufficient monies to finance retirement. Equally
important, we have examined the methods of payouts and the patterns of
decumulation embedded in these programs. The new realities of financial
markets and the greater recognition of risk and uncertainty make it imper-
ative to develop a new structure to enhance future retirement security. This
volume informs the debate by exploring how workers and firms can reas-
sess the risk associated with retirement saving and respond creatively to the
new risks and realities.
The studies included in this volume highlight several key points central
to enhancing retirement risk management, in order to reduce some of the
uncertainty surrounding the retirement saving process, the accumulation
of sufficient assets for retirement, funding of retirement plans, and manag-
ing assets in retirement. Most salient is the urgent need for greater financial
education, financial literacy, and support for financial advice and planning.
Individuals who have inadequate or incorrect information about their retire-
ment plans and general financial mathematics will make retirement deci-
sions that undermine their economic well-being. An important policy
concern is whether older workers can, in fact, boost their financial literacy
to make better retirement choices. Plan sponsors also have a key role to play,
as do financial advisors, in their role of finding innovative solutions to the
uncertainties of aging. And last, but certainly not least, new financial pro-
ducts including longevity risk financing will be invaluable in making retire-
ment more secure for millions of today’s workers.
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